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Faculté des Sciences Economiques, 7 place Hoche 35000 Rennes, Rennes
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Fiscal Rules and Political Composition Cycles
Abstract: It is commonly believed that governments use budget deficits to manipulate voters in election years. However, this result is largely driven by findings for developing countries. Fiscal rules may prevent budget deficits in OECD countries. We argue both theoretically and empirically that governments may switch to manipulating by shifting to more visible spending components. Corruption and political instability are contributing factors.
Source : CREM - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management sur OpenAgenda, en données ouvertes. Les horaires et tarifs peuvent changer : vérifiez-les auprès de l'organisateur.